Avoiding MAD

I have briefly discussed the concept of MAD, or mutually assured destruction, here on this blog before. To review: during the Cold War, the US and the USSR followed a policy of “deterrence”—they realized that MAD would occur if either side attacked the other, so they tacitly agree to not take military direction against each other. But, as the Cold War proved, there are many ways to work around the policy of deterrence and MAD, as well as flaws in the theory itself.

When two nations have nuclear weapons and can destroy each other, in theory relations between the two should be tense but peaceful. Of course, the obvious problem is that even though this creates peace, this peace is jejune and superficial, as it did not come about by a true mutual agreement. Next, MAD does not account for technological advancement—if one country develops superior missile interception technology, that country can attack the other nation with impunity, as they no longer have to fear MAD. Additionally, there is the “Dr. Strangelove” argument—incompetence in government or a rouge faction of the military can create a situation that leads to war and eventually MAD. Next, if a government is willing to accept the terrible humanitarian toll of a nuclear war, they may go ahead and fight one anyway, in defiance of the theory of deterrence. Finally, MAD only applies to those countries with ICBMs—third world countries, which are not tied down to deterrence, can still attack or be attacked without the fear of nuclear bombing.

Even worse, as the Cold War proves, MAD does not necessarily mean an end to war. During the Cold War, the US implemented a plan of “containment,” in which we attempted to keep Soviet ideology from spreading. (This culminated in the Marshall Plan, which pumped $12 billion into post-war Europe to prevent them from lapsing into communism.) Also, as the Korean and the Vietnam war prove, proxy wars can still be fought in areas outside of the countries practicing deterrence. Lastly, the nations practicing deterrence can agree to fight each other using conventional warfare.

Out of all of these methods to circumvent MAD, the most frightening are the concepts that world leaders will continue to find technology to break out of MAD, and the fact that the military could settle for a nuclear war with “acceptable” losses. Also, during the Cold War both the US and the USSR worked to develop superior ballistic missile technologies, and both sides claimed that their own missiles were ahead of any competition, in what was called the “missile gap.” Amazingly, both the US and USSR made provisions for rebuilding their countries in the event of a nuclear attack, and both continued to develop missile defense technology. (“Dr. Strangelove” satirizes this aspect of the Cold War by suggesting that both countries will attempt to out-plan each other in this respect; when it is suggested to the US military that people can survive a nuclear blast by hiding in mine shaft, one general demands that mines be built deeper so that the US does not fall behind the Soviets in the “mine shaft gap.”)

Interestingly, the threat of MAD is just as prevalent as it was during the Cold War, yet the fear of nuclear war is no longer as prevalent as it once was. I suspect that the main reason for this is that there are no longer nations that were polar opposites and enemies as much as the United States and Soviet Union. Though tensions between superpowers flare up occasionally, the Cold War mentality of ultra-nationalism is mostly extinct. Next, remember that today we are more afraid of terrorist nuclear attacks rather than ballistic missiles. Bu the threat of MAD still exists; nuclear stockpiles are as large as they have ever been, and developing countries such as North Korea and Iran are soon going to be nuclear as well.

Despite its flaws, though, MAD and deterrence did prevent bloodshed, particularly during the Cold War. However, for countries to be truly at peace they must be allies, not enemies kept from war because of the fear of MAD.