Sunday, March 1, 2009

Skepticism and the scientific method

As I have mentioned before, I am something of a Pyrrhonian skeptic. Today, I would like to discuss the differences between pyrrhonism and the scientific method, as well the effects of this difference.

In many ways Pyrrhonian skepticism and the scientific method are quite similar. Both teach that human beings are small, Lilliputian creatures in a big and mysterious universe. Both embrace the unknown, asking people to search for answers amid uncertainty.

But beyond that, the two philosophies are radically different. The first main difference has to do with absolute truth. Pyrrhonism rejects the idea of absolute truth, stating that nothing can be known with absolute certainty. The scientific method, on the other hand, holds that absolute truth can be uncovered with experimentation. Science claims that the universe is a logical one, and certain truths can be uncovered by logic and reasoning (skepticism rejects this analysis, since the universe is not necessarily logical).

The other central difference between skepticism and the scientific method has to do with one of the later additions to the list of key principles of the scientific method, Occam’s Razor. This is the idea that if one is presented with multiple hypothesis, the simplest one is the one that should be considered the most credible. Occam’s Razor has its roots some of the writings of Thomas Aquinas. In one of his works, he states “If a thing can be done adequately by means of one, it is superfluous to do it by means of several; for we observe that nature does not employ two instruments where one suffices.” Pure skepticism rejects this analysis, since the complexity of a hypothesis is not necessarily related to its validity. Also, Occam’s Razor includes the elimination of hypotheses that are contrary to common sense. Skepticism rejects this analysis as well, since “common sense” is subjective and the popularity of a hypothesis may or may not be related to whether it is true. On a related note, the scientific method holds that an experiment should be able to replicated and any other scientist should be able to achieve the same result. (Skepticism rejects this claim as well.) 

So, are the scientific method’s divergences from skepticism strengths or weaknesses? Are they what has carried science this far, or are they foibles that have prevented science from reaching even further? I suspect that the answer is a little of both. Pyrrhonian skepticism’s rejection of absolute truth would make science grind to a halt if it were a part of the scientific method. This rejection absolute truth would also contradict the scientific principle that experiments can always be replicated, which would make experimentation pointless. Science needs some level of common sense, since it assumes philosophical Realism and Infallibilism (otherwise there would be no point to truth-seeking).

But Occam’s Razor is another matter—I believe that this principle has actually slowed science down. The main reason for this is that the definitions of “common sense” and even “simplest hypothesis” are dependent on cultural factors and religious beliefs. For example, in Galileo’s time the “simplest hypothesis” was that the Sun rotated around the Earth. Today, the scientific community often uses Occam’s Razor to shun hypotheses that seem unlikely or unpleasant to them, even if such hypotheses are plausible. Though science needs some level of common sense, Occam's Razor is going too far.  

3 comments:

steve y said...

Yeah, I agree. I definitely don't think there is a correlation between complexity and validity.

And the vocab words were 'Lilliputian' and 'foibles'.

Bill said...

Nicely done.

A Seeker said...

I don't believe Ockham's razor is about validity as much as it is a methodological discipline. The point is that it constrains the theorist to come up with an answer that introduces the least complexity while still offering a comprehensive solution to the problem.

In other words, it forces you to really think about each conceptual element in your answer and evaluate whether it is actually necessary in order to resolve the quandary being considered. Without this constraint, it would be easy to suggest as many explanatory theories as their are phenomena. Requiring simplicity (but not at the expense of comprehensiveness) also induces us to examine whether or not there are connections between the phenomena.