Operation Cast Lead

Though I don’t usually discuss current events here, I would like to take another day to discuss and reflect on the violence in the Gaza Strip, which has been going on all day yesterday and today. As of the time of this writing, almost 350 Palestinians have been killed, and Israel has just declared war on Hamas. In Israel, the bombings are code-named Operation Cast Lead, after a popular Hanukkah song, which refers to a lead dreidel. But I am not here simply to report the news—I would like to discuss what has been going on in Gaza, not just over the past few days but over the past few years.

I would first like to dispel the American illusion that Israel is innocent, good, and clearly in the right. To do this, I would like to briefly explain the recent history of Gaza. In 2005, the unilateral disengagement plan gave Israel control over Gaza’s airspace, utilities, and navy, which caused Amnesty International to classify them an “occupying power.” In 2006, Hamas won a legitimate election in the Gaza Strip, giving them control over the Palestinian Legislative Council. In response, the Israeli military surrounded Gaza and restricted trade in and out of the region. In turn, Palestinian militants bombed Israeli settlements in the region. In 2007, Gaza militants fought Fatah and managed to take over the entire Gaza Strip. Israel once again blockaded Gaza, only this time they severely restricted trade, cut utilities, and restricted medical and fuel supplies. Unemployment skyrocketed to 70%, and human rights organizations worldwide were furious. Once again, Hamas militants responded with rocket attacks. In April, Hamas announced their goals for the near future, many of which infuriated Israelis. However, in June Egypt managed to negotiate a cease-fire; a week or so ago this treaty expired, and hostilities prevented it from being renewed; this caused the violence you see today. But I’ll cut the history lesson short—the point is, Israel is far from innocent (and I haven’t even gotten to the West Bank!).

I am not denouncing Israel, though—I am simply explaining the fact that no one is innocent in this situation. That said, how can we go forward from here?

Obviously a worldwide “scolding” of Israel and Hamas isn’t enough (although, interestingly, the both Egypt and the Palestinian National Authority blame Hamas for causing the violence); UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon has called for an immediate cease-fire, and the EU and UNSC have called for similar actions to be taken (none of which have happened). Israel and Hamas are willingly at war with each other, knowing full well that the international community’s eyes are on them. How, then, can we prevent further violence if UN threats are not enough? The obvious answer is UN intervention. Even Hamas probably isn’t bold enough to openly badmouth the UN; if, once the current crisis has ended (assuming it doesn’t boil over into another intifada) the UN should intervene to negotiate a long-term peace treaty. If UN troops are housed in or around Gaza, it is unlikely that even Hamas will break such a treaty, at least immediately.

For now, though, all we can do is watch and wait. My sympathy is reserved for the families of those lost in this senseless violence, both Israeli and Palestinian.  

How to handle Hamas

As those of you who have been following the international news today and yesterday already know, the ceasefire in Gaza has ended, and war has once again erupted between Hamas and Israel. Regardless of your views on the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is obvious that Hamas is a serious impediment to peace: it is very difficult to negotiate with an organization that is both the legitimate leadership of the Palestinian National Authority and a terrorist group. Unless you are in favor of the State of Israel being completely obliterated, you probably admit that Hamas needs to be destroyed, or at least fixed up a bit.

But which one: complete destruction of the group, or reorganization? In my opinion, reorganization is probably the better option. Hamas does perform some important political duties: most importantly, it is a legitimate government over the Gaza Strip. If it were destroyed (which is highly impractical), another, more corrupt government would arise in its place. However, if Hamas were “cleaned up” to separate the legitimate parts from the terrorist cells, Israel would have a much better time negotiating with the right people, which might lead to more permanent peace treaties.

But how to go about it? This is one of the most difficult political questions of our century, and my answer is far from complete. In general, though, I believe that intervention from the international community is needed, including a full-scale UN investigation of Hamas. The purpose of this is to remove anyone involved in Hamas who has possible connections to terrorist cells. (In all probability this is going to be a large portion of the organization.) Any funding from other countries or groups (which they are supposedly receiving today) will be found and isolated. After this purging, the UN must continue to watch Hamas closely. If they are under such intense scrutiny, it is more likely that Hamas will agree to a peace treaty, at least temporarily. Of course, all this is easier said than done. The task will probably take years are require a huge amount of investigating. However, if Hamas can be made into a group that is truly legitimate, the Gaza Strip will be on the road to peace.  

Exploring the Chinese Room

Monday, in my post about the Turing test, I briefly explored John Searle’s thought-experiment “The Chinese Room.” Today, I would like to delve further into this interesting topic.

First, I would like to better explain the argument itself—I feel did something of a shoddy job of doing so in Monday’s post.  Rather than explain it myself, I will quote Searle’s description of the thought-experiment from his paper, “Minds, Brains, and Programs.” Unfortunately his description is a bit lengthy:

“Suppose that I'm locked in a room and given a large batch of Chinese writing. Suppose furthermore (as is indeed the case) that I know no Chinese, either written or spoken, and that I'm not even confident that I could recognize Chinese writing as Chinese writing distinct from, say, Japanese writing or meaningless squiggles. To me, Chinese writing is just so many meaningless squiggles.

Now suppose further that after this first batch of Chinese writing I am given a second batch of Chinese script together with a set of rules for correlating the second batch with the first batch. The rules are in English, and I understand these rules as well as any other native speaker of English. They enable me to correlate one set of formal symbols with another set of formal symbols, and all that 'formal' means here is that I can identify the symbols entirely by their shapes. Now suppose also that I am given a third batch of Chinese symbols together with some instructions, again in English, that enable me to correlate elements of this third batch with the first two batches, and these rules instruct me how to give back certain Chinese symbols with certain sorts of shapes in response to certain sorts of shapes given me in the third batch. Unknown to me, the people who are giving me all of these symbols call the first batch "a script," they call the second batch a "story. ' and they call the third batch "questions." Furthermore, they call the symbols I give them back in response to the third batch "answers to the questions." and the set of rules in English that they gave me, they call "the program."

Now just to complicate the story a little, imagine that these people also give me stories in English, which I understand, and they then ask me questions in English about these stories, and I give them back answers in English. Suppose also that after a while I get so good at following the instructions for manipulating the Chinese symbols and the programmers get so good at writing the programs that from the external point of view that is, from the point of view of somebody outside the room in which I am locked -- my answers to the questions are absolutely indistinguishable from those of native Chinese speakers. Nobody just looking at my answers can tell that I don't speak a word of Chinese.

Let us also suppose that my answers to the English questions are, as they no doubt would be, indistinguishable from those of other native English speakers, for the simple reason that I am a native English speaker. From the external point of view -- from the point of view of someone reading my "answers" -- the answers to the Chinese questions and the English questions are equally good. But in the Chinese case, unlike the English case, I produce the answers by manipulating uninterpreted formal symbols. As far as the Chinese is concerned, I simply behave like a computer; I perform computational operations on formally specified elements. For the purposes of the Chinese, I am simply an instantiation of the computer program.”

Searle’s point is obvious: In the proof, he is manipulating Chinese symbols without true semantic understanding of what they mean. This, he argues, is what computers do: they simply carry out “the program” without having true understanding of what they are doing. It is important to note that Searle is not a dualist—he does not believe the human mind has any kind of non-physical component. He concedes that the human brain is simply a biological “machine,” and that an artificial mind could hypothetically be constructed. Searle is trying to prove that a computer program can never create a true “mind” because computer programs are in scripts that have syntax but no semantics. Essentially, Searle is challenging the computational theory of the mind: the idea that human beings cannot be explained in terms of input/output (note how similar this is to philosophical determinism).  

Also, I should mention that though I had never heard of the Chinese Room argument until the other day, it is one of the most important issues in cognitive science and philosophy today. In fact, the influential computer scientist Patrick Hays even joked that cognitive science should be renamed “the ongoing research program of showing Searle's Chinese Room Argument to be false.” There are an enormous number of responses to the argument, and unfortunately I do not have time to cover them all today. However, I would like to look at the implications of Searle’s argument and at some of the more convincing responses. 

Many philosophers and scientists have looked at what the Chinese Room thought-experiment implies, including John Searle himself. Searle created the following proof from his thought-experiment:

Axiom 1: Computer programs are formal and syntactic.

Axiom 2: Minds have mental, semantic contents.

Axiom 3: Syntax is not enough to create a semantic mind.

Conclusion: Programs are “neither constitutive of nor sufficient for minds.”

Searle’s conclusion is intuitive enough, given the data he is starting with. Axioms one and two are pretty obvious—1 states that computers have no true understanding of things, and 2 states that human minds do. Axiom 3 is what the Chinese Room proves—the fact that a computer can pass a Turing test without true understanding (at least, according to Searle). However, as I mentioned, the Chinese Room has attracted thousands of intellectual critics, and there are a multitude of responses to the proof from various areas of science. These responses attack Searle’s axioms, his conclusion, and the validity of the thought-experiment itself. I would like to take a few moments to explore some of these claims. 

The first is the “systems” response. This states that even though the man in the room does not understand Chinese, the man, the room, and the program as a system do. However, Searle’s reply is that it is possible for the man to memorize the program, making him the entire system even though he still has no understanding of Chinese characters. The “systems” reply is that the mind is virtual mind, which has a variable physical component. (For example, the software of a computer is a virtual machine) Thus, there is an “implementation independent” virtual mind at work. Searle, however, would maintain that such a virtual mind is still a syntactic simulation incapable of cognitive understanding.

Other responses are related to so-called appeals to reason. For example, a “program” to do what Searle is suggesting would be enormously complex, and it may require a whole new kind of programming. However, I will not even address these because they are insignificant—the Chinese room is a hypothetical case, after all. 

So, what is the final verdict on Searle’s Chinese Room? I don’t have one. Searle’s proof seems legitimate, but several of its aspects remain unproven, as many of the responses show. I promise to revisit the Chinese Room soon, since it is such an important and influential argument. For now, all I can say is that since the Chinese Room resides in the grey area between science and philosophy, someday either experimentation or logic may yield the answer. 

Musings on the Turing test (part 1)

In 1950, philosopher and computer scientist Alan Turing began to explore the philosophic implications of computers, specifically the problem of machine “intelligence.” Turing asked whether machines can ever obtain true intelligence or consciousness, and if they can, how do they differ from human beings (besides physically)? Turing published the following in a paper:

“It is not difficult to devise a paper machine [computer] which will play a not very bad game of chess. Now get three men as subjects for the experiment. A, B and C. A and C are to be rather poor chess players, B is the operator who works the paper machine. Two rooms are used with some arrangement for communicating moves, and a game is played between C and either A or the paper machine. C may find it quite difficult to tell which he is playing.”

What Turing is saying is that in this case a computer is indistinguishable from a human. To solve this problem, Turing developed the Turing test (named after himself), which is a hypothetical written test that can distinguish between a human being and a computer. Many versions of the test have been created, covering a variety of subjects. In fact, contests have been held, in which programmers attempt to create computer programs that can pass the Turing test (or at least appear to pass it according to a certain percent of judges).

Despite its popularity, the Turing test is often criticized. One of the most compelling arguments against it is the thought-experiment “the Chinese Room,” devised by John Searle in 1980. Searle argues that a computer could answer all of the questions correctly but still not have true intelligence, which is what the test is really meant to discover. In other words, the computer could answer the question simply by using a complex series of decision algorithms (to anyone who knows Java, think nested “if” statements). Thus, the computer is simply manipulating ideas in the way a non-Chinese speaking person can manipulate Chinese letters—they can answer a question in written Chinese without actually understanding what they are saying. This brings up a slew of complicated questions, including determinism, philosophy of mind, and the problem of consciousness.

First, determinism and the computational theory of the mind. This essentially means that human minds are computers in that we just take in data and process it in the same way computers do, and we have no “understanding” of concepts more than computers do. If this true, computers will eventually be able to pass the Turing test; all they have to do is mimic the algorithms the human mind uses. However, many philosophers believe in dualism, the idea that the mind has a non-physical component, or something like a soul. In this case, computers will never be able to pass the Turing test, as a non-physical mind would truly have free will, which a computer cannot mimic.

The problem of consciousness also comes into play, since this is another aspect of the human mind a computer may or may not be able to copy. This depends on the nature of consciousness—if it simply stems from the human brain having a huge number of neurons, there is hope for computer consciousness yet. But if it comes from a non-physical source such as the soul, computers will never be able to achieve consciousness as we know it. Also, the relationship between consciousness and self-awareness come into play here: Unless consciousness is defined as simply self-awareness, computers may be able to achieve self-awareness without achieving true consciousness.

If we ignore these philosophical problems for a moment, though, as follow the “Chinese room” theory that computers may be able to pass the Turing test even if they are truly “intelligent,” we can examine the problem more practically. Many computer scientists have predicted that computers will soon be able to pass the Turing test because of future advances in computing power. Moore’s Law holds that the number of transistors in a integrated circuit will double every two years, which means an exponential increase in computing power. So far, computer science has followed this pattern, However, many intellectuals argue that eventually this will break down because there is a point at which it is almost impossible to make smaller transistors. Moore himself stated that he doubts that the law will continue forever. Though some believe that quantum computers will be developed enough to replace circuits by the time this happens, this will also mean that Moore’s law no longer holds true because it only applies to integrated circuits.

However, it is clear that computers are going to undergo huge increase in processing power, whether they follow Moore’s Law or not. If quantum computers eventually become a reality, the amount of computing power available is going to be enormous. With all this “intelligence” at a computer’s fingertips, the Turing test as we know it will soon become obsolete, as computers will be able to immediately determine the “human” answer to any Turing test question with a low probability of error.

This aspect of the implications of the Turing test is a popular subject of debate among intellectuals. Two prominent philosopher/futurists, Mitch Kapor and Raymond Kurzweil, have placed a $10,000 bet on whether computers will be able to pass a Turing test by 2029. Check out this link for their arguments and the conditions of the bet. 

Another time, perhaps, I will review Kapor and Kurzweil’s arguments. I have barely scratched the surface on this topic, so I will almost certainly discuss it again. 

On polygamy

I believe I have briefly mentioned my thoughts on polygamy on this blog in “The ever-changing purpose of culture part 2.” Today, I would like to delve into more detail on why polygamy should be the nuclear family of the future.

I would like to clear a few things up before I begin. First, I’d like to address the issue of the actual definition of the word. Whenever we hear it today, we curl up our noses in disgust. This is because of the negative connotation the work has acquired over time. Also, note that the original definition of the word is “the practice or custom of having more than one wife and/or husband at the same time.” It does not simply mean one husband having multiple wives—it is a term that is interchangeable with group marriage, which refers to any pluralistic marriage arrangement. This is the definition of the word I will be using. Additionally, I would like to remind my readers that I am not a polygamist. Regardless of how much polygamy makes sense, I have no desire to participate in it myself. I cannot even conceive of loving more than one person, but it is my hope that in the future other generations can learn to do so, for reasons I am about to explain.

Before I delve into the world of polygamy, I would like to point out problems with the Western world’s current monogamous system (keep in mind that in many Eastern countries polygamy is legal; see map at left). Divorce is even easier than ever, and as a result, divorce rates are on the decline. This creates problems because it creates single-parent family units, which are poorer environments for raising children, mostly because our economic system works in such a way that married couples are able to make far more income than single parents. A death of one of the spouses in a family can also create the same problem. Also, sexual jealousy has run rampant in our culture. Men are often encouraged to fight over women, and hypergamy has become common practice. Finally, imbalance in the ratio of men to women in certain societies is beginning to cause social trouble. These problems are all caused by the fact that monogamy is far more maladroit than we realize. 

Before I explain how polygamy can solve these problems, I would like to explore different types of polygamy, and talk about why some forms are better than others. The two most common forms, polygyny (one man having more than one wife) and polyandry (one woman having more than one husband) have some benefits, but they are not the best form of polygamy as far as resolving the issues above goes. True group marriage (multiple husbands and wives) is superior to these two, but the most superior (in my opinion) is line marriage. Line marriage is essentially the same as group marriage, but new partners will continue to marry into the group as others grow older. Thus, the marriage is stable and can in theory last forever.

The reasons polygamy—specifically line marriage—can rectify the problems stated above are quite simple. Polygamous families are economically superior to monogamous families. The increased number of incomes in a polygamous family more than makes up for the increased number of children, resulting in a more economically prosperous family unit. If one spouse should lose his/her job, the family is not going to be in financial trouble because the other co-spouses can continue to provide income until the unemployed one returns to work. If a death in the family were to occur, it is less emotionally stressful because of the abundance of parental figures less economically stressful because of the additional incomes. Polygamous families are also more well adapted socially than monogamous families. At least one or two parents will be able to remain at home to care for the children, which is much better environment for raising children than sending the child to a day-care facility. Also, divorces are more difficult to go though with and have less impact on the family than in monogamous marriages. If one spouse is in love with several of his/her co-husbands or co-wives, it is unlikely that he/she will wish to divorce the family because he/she does not like one co-spouse. Also, in line marriages, even if one spouse decides to divorce the family, another person can marry in to make up for it. Polygamous family members are probably less likely to get into serious arguments than monogamous family members, since in a group marriage other can mediate a fight between two spouses. Next, polygamy will teach human beings how to lessen the sexual jealousy that has become imbedded in our society and in our conditioning. Today, many people—myself included—find it difficult to imagine the though of marrying or being in love with more than one person. However, group marriage will prevent this sexual jealousy from being a part of our conditioning, since children are constantly exposed to their parents loving more than one person. Also, polygamy solves any problems related to an imbalance in the male-female ratio. In an unbalanced monogamous system, a large portion of the more populous gender would be unable to marry, but in a polygamous system this is not a problem—the imbalance will simply carry over into the marriage system rather than preventing marriages.

To conclude, I hope that in the future polygamy will become a cultural and societal norm, and we will no longer look down on it. I would also like to restate the fact that despite the fact that I agree with polygamy on an intellectual level, I have difficulty coping with it on a personal level. (I am emphasizing this simply because I do not want anyone getting the wrong idea.)  However, I hope that future generations will soon come to realize the benefits of group marriage, and create a happier and better society for themselves.         

**On an unrelated note: Can anyone identify the tawdry hat in the photo to the top left? Specifically, what era is it from?  

MADness

Warning: Today’s post is a little morbid.

MAD, or mutually assured destruction, is a military acronym for a nuclear war in which both (or all) countries were able to hit each other with nuclear weapons. Obviously this is a scenario we would like to avoid, and for the past 50 years, nuclear non-proliferation groups have been trying to do just that. These groups have been working to ban nuclear weapons and reduce nuclear stockpiles by ensuring the safe decommissioning of these weapons. These programs have been met with mixed success—overall, stockpiles have not gone down, but there is certainly more awareness of who has nuclear arms. Some countries, such as Russia, have only agreed to decommission missiles that are now outdated anyway.

But recently I was wondering if non-proliferation is really what is best for us. As crazy as it may sound, it may be safer for us to have nuclear weapons than not to have them.

I would like to discuss an analogy used by Tom Clancy in one of his books. It goes something like this: I am pointing a loaded gun at you, which has six bullets in it. You realize that this is a problem, so you decide to reduce the danger by convincing me to take three bullets out of the gun. But the fact remains: three bullets is more than enough to do you in. Clancy’s point is obvious: reducing nuclear arms stockpiles is useless—either nuclear weapons must be totally banned, or simply allowed in any quantity. One is all it takes to commit atrocities.

Next, remember that the fear of MAD is one of the reasons a nuclear war has never taken place. Because missile interception pales in comparison with missile stealth technology, no one is going to want to start a nuclear was because it is more than likely that everyone is going to get hit. Even though we came awfully close during the Cuban missile crisis, the reason we were able to eventually resolve the problem is that no one really wanted MAD. The fear of MAD also deters wars between superpowers, since nuclear war would seem the most likely option—and neither side really wants that.

Also, consider the other potential uses for nuclear weapons. For example, there is no other way to swat an incoming asteroid out of the sky. Also, “clean” atomic bombs are often used to create huge holes in the ground for mining purposes.

Of course, I am not suggesting that nuclear weapons are nothing to be worried about. I do have some serious concerns when it comes to WMD’s. The first is terrorism. Recently New York City created something called “the ring,” which is a series of radiation detectors at tollbooths on highways leading into the city. Why? Because the threat of a nuclear attack is still present. Countries like Russia must not be so careless when it comes to security, since carelessness with weapons of mass destruction puts everyone at risk. Next, third-world countries with nuclear weapons worry me. India does not bother me because their centralized government is stable, but what about countries like Iran and North Korea? They are far from benevolent, and their political climates are too turbulent to be safe. Mixed with nuclear weapons, that won’t be a pretty sight.

I would now like to make one final comment on MAD. Despite the fact that it deters war, I have no doubt that if one country launched a nuclear missile a whole bunch of countries would. This might sound natural, but think about it for a moment. If you are the leader of a country that is about to be obliterated, why take steps to obliterate the people attacking you? It serves no logical purpose, and is simply a destructive act of vengeance. Once world leaders realize this, I think, the world will be much safer. Because, as some philosopher once remarked, in the nuclear age the enemy is war itself. 

Bumper to bumper

Today’s subject matter is a bit different from the more philosophical topics I usually discuss on this blog. However, it is an important social issue, and I feel it is worth mentioning.

What I would like to talk about today is traffic. Specifically, I’d like to talk about Manhattan, where traffic has become such a chronic disease that many New Yorkers don’t even own a car. The root of the problem is obvious: Manhattan is tiny, only about 23 square miles, but it houses over 1.6 million people. All these people (plus the ones coming in to work from the other boroughs or from New Jersey) have to get around somehow, and public transportation simply can’t take them all.

But I think the solution is remarkably simple: ban cars. This may sound radical, but it is probably the most effective solution to Manhattan’s traffic problem, as I will explain.

My basic plan is as follows: No privately owned cars are allowed inside the island of Manhattan, except on the one road that travels along the circumference of the city and two or three that cross it east-west. To make up for this, public transportation (subway trains, buses, etc.) will be increased. Taxi services can continue (taxies are not privately owned) but they will be subject to regulation to limit the number of taxies each company can put on the road at one time. The owners of facilities relating to motor vehicle parking or maintenance inside the new no-car zone will be given the option of selling their property to the state of New York for a reasonable price. Subsidies will also be given to these companies, so that parking garages and other facilities can be built along the island’s perimeter.

The benefits of such a program are obvious. The most obvious benefit is the fact that “traffic” as we know it will no longer exist in most of Manhattan. There are also huge environmental benefits—thousands of cars will be taken of the road, reducing CO₂ emissions and even possibly reducing oil dependence by a noticeable amount. By removing these cars, this program will also help keep the city cleaner and improve the air quality. It will promote a healthier lifestyle for many New Yorkers, which is important because America is gradually becoming more and more obese.

Furthermore, this idea is not without precedent—a few years ago, Beijing had very few cars relative to the size of the city. Most people got around by walking or using Beijing’s most famous bike, the “flying pigeon.” Today, though, urban sprawl has made the car a necessity for many people in Beijing. But Manhattan doesn’t have that problem—its size is permanently limited, so anyone who lives and works in Manhattan will never need a car.

But how would New York legislature pass such a program? In its initial phases, this kind of project is enormously expensive. It would be highly undesirable (at least at first) to people who commute in, out, or through Manhattan. Because of this, I doubt that even a quarter of New Yorkers would vote for this program. Thus, the only way for something like this to be implemented would be for the governor of New York and the mayor of NYC to cooperate and execute it before bureaucracy bogs the whole thing down. I would also recommend that the program be executed as quickly as possible—people will initially whine and complain, but eventually they will see the long-term benefits. (Whereas if it were phased in slowly, public opinion of it would be so negative that the whole thing would most likely be cancelled.) Unfortunately this is rather draconian, but the simple fact is most New Yorkers will not be too happy about not being able to use their cars (at least at first).

This program could also be applied to other cities. Los Angeles recently underwent “Manhattanization,” and it has become an extremely high-density city. However, Manhattan is still the most ideal choice because of its size limitations. 

Law and order (part 5)

The series on justice systems continues with a discussion of the relationship between justice systems and utilitarianism. Last time, I briefly delved into the subject of which is more desirable in a justice system, utilitarianism or fairness. I now realize that I was somewhat biased towards utilitarianism, and I assumed that it is true in order to use it to refute the justification of revenge-based justice systems. Today, I would like to delve into this topic in more detail.

Utilitarianism can be defined as “the idea that the moral worth of an action is determined solely by its contribution to overall utility: that is, its contribution to happiness or pleasure as summed among all persons.”

So, the first question we must ask is: Is utilitarianism in the best interests of the general public, and if yes, should it be the goal of the justice system to achieve this?

Though the answer might seem obvious to some, I am somewhat suspicious of this concept. Utilitarianism and the conservative interpretation of fairness are at opposite ends of the philosophical spectrum; the former ignores personal responsibility and free will, while the second puts far too much emphasis on these concepts. I have already discussed my distrust of extreme focus on fairness as defined in “Law and order part 4,” and I have similar sentiments toward extreme utilitarianism. I should also add that such extreme utilitarianism is impractical. It would most likely require either a centralized, powerful government or a sudden wave of idealism to sweep the world. The latter is highly unlikely, and the former probably couldn’t stay in power long enough to implement a utilitarian system. Why are these requirements? A truly utilitarian system cannot be implemented overnight, and to be effective it must have public support.

Furthermore, utilitarianism seems to be linked to justice systems that are based on treating society deterministically and ignoring the concept of free will. The Brave New World system is essentially utilitarian, since its main goal is to create the most amount of happiness at the expense of certain moral and social constructs. It also uses brainwashing techniques to keep society stable, which clearly follows the utilitarian belief of “greatest good for the greatest number.” This raises the question which I touched on briefly in “Law and order part 2” and “Law and order part 3”: Is it acceptable to treat society as if it is deterministic (for the purpose of implementing utilitarianism) even if we do not know if we have free will? Treating society as if it is deterministic has its obvious benefits, namely, the potential for an enormous amount of happiness to be created (i.e. Brave New World).  Even so, there are still some problems with practicality, but far fewer than in other systems.

Furthermore, I would like to explore some of the negatives of a society based on utilitarianism. An infinity number of types of utilitarian societies could possibly exist, but most could be placed on a spectrum between a strong centralized system and utilitarian anarchy. There are clear flaws to both systems. The centralized side is more focused on the State conditioning people to be happy, like in BNW. Though this can be effective, in the case of a catastrophe the society would collapse because this conditioning must be highly specialized. On the other hand, a utilitarian anarchy would be focused on people finding their own kind of happiness, but there are problems here too. For example, what if a particular person’s brand of happiness was sadism? There are no institutions in place to protect the society from this, or from any of the other problems that usually befall anarchy. Instead, the most effective utilitarian society would probably be more in the middle. A government could keep the peace, but on the whole it would not intrude into people’s lives unless they harmed others. But what kind of justice system would this middle-range utilitarian society have? My bet is on the rehab system. This system is the closest to utilitarianism, since it is focused on not causing any unnecessary pain. 

For those enjoying this series on justice systems and their justifications, I am sorry to say I am going to take a break from it (at least for now). Though I have been far from laconic when it comes to this subject, I can’t think of much more to add at the moment. However, I doubt this will be the last time the issues discussed in this series are mentioned on this blog—many of them are far too important to forget entirely. 

The meaning of ‘is’

When pressed in court about his affair with Monica Lewinsky, former President Bill Clinton used evasive tactics and dodged as many questions as he could. Unfortunately for him, he got a bit carried away, and, when asked a direct question about his affair, Clinton answered famously:

“It depends on what the meaning of ‘is’ is.”

As absurd as it was at the time, Clinton brings up an interesting philosophical point. Like money, language is not an absolute: it only has meaning in relation to human beings. In other words, words only have meaning because we, the human population, choose to give them meaning.

The best way to illustrate this is to use the example of a children’s book, Frindle. In this story, the main character realizes that he can make words mean whatever he wants them to. He then decides to call a pen a “frindle” from then on, and he enlists others to do the same. Eventually the new word spreads all over the world, and it eventually becomes listed in the dictionary.

This puts the concepts of “connotation” and “denotation” in a new light. By convention, a word’s denotation is the word’s literary definition, and its connotation is its implied or slang meaning. But this is only because our dictionaries are not flexible and they are slow to adapt when the connotation of a word changes. However, this becomes somewhat give-and-take since we rely on our dictionaries to clarify the meaning of a word for us.

This is also an argument for an international auxiliary constructed language. Since many languages, especially English, have become dominated by connotative slang, idioms, and other misleading aspects, the language barrier is often more potent than we think. However, a language like Zamenhof’s Esperanto would be just as prone to slang and idioms as any other language, which greatly defeats its purpose. But logical languages, such as Lojban, are structured in such a way that idioms and slang are almost impossible, which is another reason I believe Lojban is a good candidate for an international language.

This also relates to an argument I brought up in my very first post on this blog (all the way at the bottom of the page), in which I viciously attacked many aspects of a paper by the philosopher George E. Moore. Moore states at one point that he is not going to define the terms he is using because they are "common sense." However, this is a completely unjustified assumption, since the meanings of words change all the time, and when writing a philosophical paper it is important to be precise. 

But what does all this mean for poor old Bill Clinton? Absolutely nothing. In any court, a certain level of common sense is assumed, and I doubt the Supreme Court would tolerate Clinton’s semantic nitpicking.

Tomorrow: Law and order, part 5

Law and order (part 4)

At last, here is the long-awaited continuation of the series on justice systems. This time, I would like to discuss justice systems, particularly the ones I previously mentioned, in relation to the concept of fairness. Fairness can be defined as being “just or appropriate in the circumstances.”

Now, the question I would like to pose is this: Should fairness be the objective of a justice system? In other words, is it in our interest to pursue the concept of fairness, and should our justice system reinforce this? 

This question is inherently related to our current revenge-based justice system, since supporters of this system would argue that inflicting punishment on a criminal is justified because it is “fair.” But I have to ask: is it really? I think we are letting the positive connotation of the word “fair” obscure the real issue here. Even if “fair” is defined as it is above, its meaning is still somewhat ambiguous. Rather than explore the tricky semantic and linguistic issues that are causing this problem, I will simply say this: If fairness can be defined and revenge or “an eye for an eye,” then it is not necessarily something a justice system should aim to achieve.

Additionally, fairness presents another interesting problem in relation to the current justice system. I would like to raise the following question: Assuming revenge is “fair,” should the severity of a criminal’s punishment be related to the damage to the victim, or should it be based on the criminal intent of the criminal in question? There are flaws with both, as I am about to show. Consider two people, a bum and a millionaire, who each committed the same crime, which is punishable by a fine. If the severity of the fine is based on the damage to the victim, both the millionaire and the bum will be fined the same amount of money. This is obviously unfair—to the millionaire, the fine is simply pocket change, but to the bum it is necessary for survival. If the fine is based on criminal intent this problem disappears, but it violates the concept of justice as defined above: the fine is no longer fair because it is no longer based on “an eye for an eye.”

I would also like to talk about the rehab system in relation to the concept of fairness. Critics of this system would argue that its utilitarian spirit is not “fair” because it fails to treat everyone equally, since it is based on the intent to commit a crime, not the severity of the crime. Again, rather than delve into semantics I will simply say this: If the definition of fairness demands physical punishment for vengeful purposes, its desirability must be called into question. 

Next, I would like to bring up something I have not talked about at all during this series: The concept of justice in relation to religion. This is by no means a concept alien to us; our own system is derived from religions principles, and we see religious influences in justice systems besides our own as well. I would first like to bring up the point of religious tyranny. If the religion the justice system is based on is untrue, then many people have been unnecessarily punished for no reason at all. This is an obvious flaw in this kind of a system, and it is the reason I detest religious tyranny in every form. Also, I would like to bring up an interesting paradox called the Euthyphro Dilemma: Is what is moral moral because God loves it, or does God love it because it is moral? Supporters of a religion-based justice system would disagree, saying that God is inherently good, so anything God supports is also good. However, I am inclined to disagree. This is clearly a paradox, and it is a striking blow to religion-based justice systems.

Additionally, I would like to bring up a point made by Plato in The Republic. One of the characters in the book, Thrasymachus, argues that justice is simply a tool that the rich or powerful use to take advantage of the weak. In some cases this is true—when corruption dominates a government, the rich and powerful can use the courts to achieve their own ends. However, this is not what Thrasymachus is really saying—he means that the concept of justice can be used in this way. This is only true in the case of religious tyranny or elite manipulation of government; only in these cases is the entire justice system intended to subjugate the general public. This can also be refuted by the concept of justice as a social contract, which all people submit to for the greater good. Though this is not always a conscious decision, it is often true of many societies.

Next time, I will talk about the relationship between justice systems and utilitarianism. 

Happy Zamenhof Day

Today, December 15, as some of us are aware, is International Zamenhof Day. For those who are unaware of the significance of today or even of who Ludwik Łazarz Zamenhof even is, I will provide a brief description.

In 1887 L.L. Zamenhof published a book called Unua Libro, which outlined his ideas for the constructed international auxiliary language Esperanto (flag pictured). Esperanto is a combination of European “Romance Languages,” and it uses mostly Slavic grammar. The main purpose of Esperanto is to function as an international language to facilitate communication between different peoples and cultures, and as a tool in the study of linguistics. Despite some criticisms of the language, Esperanto is somewhat well known, and there are around 2 million speakers of Esperanto around the world.

This got me thinking: what, if any, are the benefits of having an international language, and is Esperanto the right language for the job? (After all, there are many other constructed languages, or conlangs, that might work even better.)

Zamenhof’s original reason for creating Esperanto has to do with communication between cultures. As he puts it in a letter in 1985:

“The place where I was born and spent my childhood gave direction to all my future struggles. In Bialystok the inhabitants were divided into four distinct elements: Russians, Poles, Germans and Jews; each of these spoke their own language and looked on all the others as enemies. In such a town a sensitive nature feels more acutely than elsewhere the misery caused by language division and sees at every step that the diversity of languages is the first, or at least the most influential, basis for the separation of the human family into groups of enemies.”

Here Zamenhof is most certainly correct: animosity between groups is often caused by language barriers. However, there are really two degrees to which a conlang can solve this problem: a) by providing a means of communication between two peoples with a language barrier, and b) by providing a language that will eventually be everyone’s natural language. Though “a” is much more realistic than “b,” the benefits of either one of these is enormous. As Zamenhof says, the peoples in the area he lived in could have gotten along much better if they did not have a language barrier restricting cultural exchange. The benefits of “b” are even greater: not only is the language barrier eliminated entirely, but the cultural baggage that comes with many languages is also eliminated, which creates a more universal culture.

Also, it could be argued that “b” would bring cultures much closer together than previously thought. The Saphir-Whorf hypothesis, created by a group of western linguists, states that a person’s natural language and idioms influences the way they view the world, almost to the point of determinism. Though this concept has not been completely proven, it has generally been accepted in Western culture and science. If a common natural language existed, everyone would have the same kind of linguistic influences on their way of thinking, bringing people even closer together.

Additionally, Esperanto has some use as a tool to study linguistics and to learn other languages. Since is it based on the “Romance Languages,” learning Esperanto is very easy for someone who already knows a Western language, and learning it makes learning another Western language much easier as well. However, in today’s world this is only somewhat useful, since Asian languages are on the rise and European ones are on the decline (in terms of populations).

But why Esperanto and not some other language? This is quite a valid point; after all, there have been many conlangs that have improved upon Esperanto, simplifying the grammar and style of the language. I am particularly biased toward Lojban (flag pictured), an artificial “logical language.” Lojban is descended from James Cooke Brown’s Loglan, which was created to allow verbal communication between humans and computers (because of the way its grammar is arranged) and to test the Saphir-Whorf hypothesis. Its grammar and structure are arranged in such a way that confusion is almost impossible, and it allows for even more ways to express statements or emotions than other languages. Like Esperanto, it is a linguistic tool and a means to better understand other languages. Since it is based on a variety of languages from all around the world, it is more valuable in this respect. However, it is somewhat difficult to learn, and it is hardly well known.

Despite these problems, Esperanto seems to be our best bet as far as a future universal language goes. So happy Zamenhof Day, and bonan nokton! 

Cronyism, government, and Robert A. Heinlein

"At one time kings were anointed by Deity, so the problem was to see to it that Deity chose the right candidate. In this age the myth is 'the will of the people'...but the problem changes only superficially."

The cynical quote above is from my favorite novel, which, as I have talked about at length before, is Robert A. Heinlein’s The Moon is a Harsh Mistress. The quote is essentially saying that democracy is not as romantic or even as valid as it seems—it is just as prone to being corrupted—or even completely rigged—as autocracy. In today’s post, I would like to talk about whether this is a valid statement, and if yes, what the implications of it are.

In the context of the novel, Heinlein is commenting on libertarian revolution. This quote is one of his not-so-subtle hints at why libertarian revolution is not as romantic or idealistic as it seems. (Despite the fact the Heinlein himself was very libertarian and opposed to big government, he did not have an idealistic view of anarchy or a libertarian society; he simply thought it was slightly better than federalism.) History definitely backs his point up here—today, historians have admitted that even the American Revolution was caused by the elite and controlled by the elite throughout the course of the Revolution and Revolutionary War. Indeed, cronyism is more prevalent in our history and in human history than we would like to think.

But if we look at the quote on a larger scale by looking at democracy as a whole in this light, the answer is quite different. Though corruption still exists in modern politics, the Western tradition of representative democracy has created a larger “ruling class,” which has diluted the cronyism inherent in the early American government. This makes it much harder for a select few to control the entire government. Though cronyism probably occurs in the White House, the balance of power in the US government prevents this from spreading to Congress. Also, despite the fact that both the Democratic Party and the GOP are controlled by a few individuals (not the same ones, of course), the fact that remain neck-and-neck in American history prevents this from spreading to the government. Finally, I should add that democracy itself actually prevents cronyism, in direct defiance of the quote. Though I often criticize the American system for not educating US citizens as much as it should, we are still immensely well informed, at least compared to the people of developing Asian nations such as India, China, or Myanmar.

However, there is still a strong argument for cronyism: the control and influence of the media in modern politics. There can be no doubt that the media, particularly the news media, has an enormous effect on the way Americans think; as American news continues to ignore world affairs and politics, the average American’s knowledge of these issues decreases proportionally. The media’s recent fixation with celebrity culture has prompted many Americans to focus on it as well. However, as I have mentioned before in “Culture: the dark side,” the media must pander to what the American people want to hear, and they are often unable to promote their own agenda because they must compete with other news organization (with some exceptions, of course). Also, it is unlikely that the media is under the thumb of the government, since they have been very critical of the government’s actions throughout the last few decades. However, the statistics cannot be ignored: the news media has been influenced by some traces of “liberal bias.” Even so, our media is far from being dominated by the elite for the purpose of spreading propaganda; this argument has very little validity.

Essentially, Heinlein has put his finger on the irony of cronyism in a democracy or a democratic revolution. In some cases, government can be run better by a few people than by the populace—but it defeats the purpose of the revolution in the first place. 

As a side note—the fictional character who says this quote in The Moon is a Harsh Mistress is a rational anarchist, which explains why he is so cynical and critical of government. 

Guns or lawyers

In the last few decades, it has become common for Americans to lash out at the legal system; politicians and especially lawyers have become targets of contempt and scorn. Though practicing law or being in politics are prestigious careers in the US, many Americans look down on lawyers or people who work for the government. However, this anti-lawyer bias is entirely unjustified, as I am about to show.

Though some Americans probably believe that the world would be better without lawyer, the truth is exactly the opposite. Before federal legal systems or in pioneer societies, government did not regulate how justice was carried out. The result? Dueling. As history buffs may remember, in the 1500’s-1800’s people carried dueling pistols with them, and nobles had more baroque, ornately decorated versions of the same. But these pistols were not simply ornaments—dueling was the common practice to settle disputes. As federalism began to increase and pioneer societies began to wane, courts began to replace dueling (though the practice did not end until the 1800’s; even President Andrew Jackson was a dueler, and he even participated in a duel during his presidency). My point is simple: which is better, dueling or a legal system? Though a few rugged individualists would boldly assert their support for the former, most Americans support the latter. When we decided to settle disputes by seeking the truth rather than with guns, we took a step towards a better, more advanced civilization, which lawyers have helped us reach.

Why, then, do we enjoy verbally abusing these people if they do so much for us? The main reason is the anti-intellectualism that is deeply ingrained into American culture. Lawyers have become grouped in with the “elite,” which causes many Americans to fear and hate them.  Also, some of this bias comes from people’s negative personal experiences with the legal system. For example, if one person loses a court case, that person will probably have some pent-up choler, which can cause this irrational hatred of lawyers and politicians. Since this kind of bias is very contagious, it does not surprise me at all that many Americans have this anti-lawyer bias even if they have never been in court themselves. 

What can we do about this? Very little, I’m afraid. There is no practical way to rid the US of the anti-intellectualism that has been imbedded in our culture for decades. Fortunately, this is not a very important social issue compared to many of the others I have discussed on this blog, so I am not too worried about this one. However, I hope that all Americans eventually come to realize what the legal system does for them, and give lawyers the appreciation they deserve. 

The Mugabe dilemma

Although the American news has neglected to cover it, Zimbabwe is currently in chaos. Over the past few weeks, they have been plagued with a cholera epidemic, and most of the country is in poverty. (The BBC News, though, has not shied away from the horror; they have a story on Zimbabwe almost daily.) Who is to blame for all this? Most fingers are pointing at Robert Mugabe, the current President of the country. Some have even gone so far as to call him “the next Hitler.”

The question I would like to bring up today is this: what, if anything, should we do about this? Mugabe is clearly not good for the country—but is it our responsibility (or the UN’s) to do something about it?

I don’t want this to turn into too much of an imperialism debate, which is why I chose this issue, where “right” and “wrong” are more clearly defined than in other instances such as Iraq. Even so, I will give my opinion, but I will leave it up to my readers to decide for themselves. 

Right now, Mugabe is undoubtedly one of the worst leaders any country has ever had. He has completely ignored the cholera outbreak, and, in other instances, has ignored human rights issues just as easily. Though other nations, such as Kenya, have called for his resignation, the African Union has announced that they refuse to do anything about him.

But what if someone does intervene? If Mugabe’s regime is destroyed, Zimbabwe will be in chaos. Huge amounts of troops will be required to protect the people of Zimbabwe against radical factions who will try to take power after Mugabe’s regime is destroyed. Huge amounts of money will be needed, too, to not only fund the coup but also stop the cholera outbreak. And, of course, it is none of our business to begin with.

What do I think? In this case, I do believe that intervention is needed. Mugabe is clearly a tyrant who needs to be deposed, the sooner the better. But I do not think that the US or the UN should get involved directly. What we need to do, instead, it work through the AU. There is no reason why the West should have to be Africa’s police force, but we cannot simply abandon them. If we work to make the African Union more like the EU, they will be able to prevent dictators such as Mugabe. By giving the AU its own police force and convincing African nations to give them more power, we will not have to get involved in African affairs nearly as much as we do now. Not only will this benefit Zimbabwe, but it will positively affect African affairs as a whole for the next few decades.

However, I leave it up to you. Is intervention justified in an extreme scenario such as this? And do you favor indirect intervention, as I do, or a more direct invasion? 

Those greedy executives...

I would like to interrupt the series on alternative justice systems for a day or two, since I have found some more pressing issues to talk about. Today, I would like to briefly discuss the automakers bailout, which is obviously a very important current event. For today, whether I support the bailout or not is irrelevant; what I would like to discuss is the way we view the executives of the Big Three automakers, and why our view is unjustified.

When the Big Three appealed to Congress, they clearly did so in bad taste. One of the executives offered to “work for $1” next year, despite the fact that his salary is already seven figures. None of the companies had a concrete plan, except that they wanted government money. And so on and so forth. The point is, it was embarrassing.

However, though I have little sympathy for them, I think we judged them incorrectly. In America, we often want our political and celebrity figures to be innocent, morally superior people (though we do not always expect this). Over the past few weeks, it has been the same with these executives: we look appalled whenever they show any outward signs of elitism or greed. But this is only because we forget who they are and what they do. Simply put, they do what they do to make money. They have never pretended to care one whit about the country as a whole, and most of them probably don’t. For some reason, we hold them to the same standards as our public officials, despite the fact that they are clearly out for themselves.

To put it in perspective: we call politicians corrupt when they serve their own interests, not the interests of the general public. But it is the job of an executive to serve himself; this is how they got to be where they are in the first place.

To summarize: I am not sympathizing with the automakers in any way. However, I am simply critical of the way we view them, and I think we should not be surprised at their motives. Unfortunately, I do not have time to elaborate on the subject today, but seeing as this is such a controversial issue I will probably revisit it sooner or later.

Law and order (part 3)

In this post, I would like to delve deeper into the moral and practical arguments behind some of the systems I have described in the previous two posts on this subject.

The first point I would like to bring up is one that I touched on briefly in “Law and order (part 2)”: the death penalty. In a pragmatic justice system (one that works towards reforming criminals), the death penalty would only be carried out on an individual who could not be rehabilitated. However, in today’s justice system the death penalty does more than just punish those who have committed heinous crimes; it also serves to deter people from committing crimes in the first place. In a system such as the rehab system, there is no fear generated by the system to keep people in line. I am not sure if I really have an answer to this problem—the situation very much like give-and-take. The current revenge-based system causes unnecessary pain, but the rehab system does less to prevent crime. As far as I know, there is no way to prevent these inconveniences in either system.

There is another point I think I have left out of my previous posts: Is there an psychological illness associated with every crime, and if yes, does this mean that all criminals can be treated and rehabilitated by the “rehab” option? This question has some serious implications to philosophy and sociology. It essentially means that if the science of psychology improves, we will eventually be able to gauge a person’s metal ability or desire to commit a crime (before they have committed one) and send them to prison or rehabilitation simply on the basis of this intent. This raises enormous moral and practical questions. First, it means that the universe is essentially deterministic (at least to the point that it affects us). This would mean that the BNW system is morally justifiable, and the Heinlein and rational anarchist systems are unjustified because responsibility does not exist in a pre-determined universe.

On a similar vein, I would like to bring up one of the main themes of the book and movie Minority Report: Is it justifiable to send people to jail or rehab before they commit a crime as long is there is probable cause that they would commit it anyway? If the universe is deterministic, the obvious answer is yes. However, if human beings do possess free will, the situation is very different. This also raises another question: is it better to treat society as if it is deterministic even if it is not (particularly in terms of a justice system)? Today, we treat society as though it has free will, and our justice system is clearly a reflection of that. In terms of the systems I have discussed, this is something like the BNW system compared to the rational anarchist system: the first completely tramples over free will, but the second trips over itself and creates numerous practical flaws because it’s main goal is to protect free will and personal responsibility. Which is more practical, and which is more moral? Neither is very practical, but the BNW system is probably more practical than the rational anarchist system because it does not have to protect personal responsibility. In terms of morals, either decision creates a huge problem if we guess wrong: if we choose BNW but people do actually have free will, we have committed a huge moral mistake. On the other hand, if we choose the Heinlein system or rational anarchy and the universe is deterministic, we will have created a lot of unnecessary unhappiness. However, I would like to throw the question out to my readers: Is protecting free will worth the problems it causes, or is it better to treat society as if it is deterministic?

This brings me to the next point I would like to make, which has to do with the rational anarchy system. Since the government is not getting involved in the justice system in this kind of configuration, the exact purpose of the system is not clearly defined. In fact, what could happen is that different individuals with different ideas of justice could go about punishing people in any way they see fit (in fact, this did happen in the Old West). The result: chaos. This is a huge blow to the rational anarchy system; keep this huge flaw in mind when thinking about the points in the paragraph above.

In the next post, I will talk about justice systems in relation to the concept of fairness.

Law and order (part 2)

This is my second post on the topic of how the justice system could be better organized. Last time, I discussed three alternatives to the current justice system.

I now realize that every system I mentioned last time criticizes the revenge-based justice system currently in use almost everywhere around the world. However, it should not be taken for granted that this concept is inherently flawed, Because of this, the first thing I would like to bring up today is the conservative response defending the revenge-based justice system.

Defenders of the prison system/revenge based justice would argue that corporal punishment can put criminals “back on course” just as well as medicine or the “rehab” option. This is because, the argument goes, all human beings have moral sense, which can be cultivated through punishment, like the way puppies are trained not to “use the bathroom” in the house. The second part of the argument is mostly based on a theistic belief, so I will ignore it for now.

However, this claim can be mostly refuted. Criminals can be rehabilitated with medicine or help from the psychiatric community, which is one of the arguments from the “rehab” option. Though this science has not been perfected, it is at least as good as plain old punishment. Thus, the pain of punishment is not necessary. Also, though I will not refute the claim that human beings have moral sense, but not all forms of insanity are simply confusion—in many cases, people are actually psychologically damaged. In those cases, mere punishment is not enough to help them, since their moral sense is damaged. Thus, punishment for the purpose of cultivating moral sense is not all it is cracked up to be.

There is also another element I would like to add into this equation, the death penalty. This is an aspect of the three options I talked about last time that I did not delve into, but I feel it deserves mention. In terms of the BNW option, the death penalty would only be used if an individual refused to conform to society, such as if their conditioning failed. In the rehab option, it is much the same—it would only be used if a person were deemed incurable of their metal illness. However, this goes against the spirit of the rehab system, since it is geared toward saving lives and protecting people from pain. In terms of the Heinlein option, the death penalty would never be invoked, since Heinlein did not believe the government should be trusted with such power.

Also, I promised to discuss more alternatives to the current justice system, so here they are:

Jeremy Bentham’s “panopticon”: according to Bentham, an English philosopher, all convicts should be placed in a prison that is designed so that all of the prisoners believe there is someone watching them. Because of this, says Bentham, the prisoners will always behave correctly because they think they are constantly under surveillance. There are few practical problems—Bentham even included architectural drawings of how to build such a prison. However, there is one overriding issue: Will it actually work? I doubt it. We have this sort of a concept even now, and it is very ineffective.

Next, the “rational anarchist” option: abolish any form of justice in terms of the State, but give people the right to administer justice themselves in any way they see fit. As alien as this idea sounds, it has occurred many times in almost all pioneer-type societies. For example, in the Wild West, vigilantes would take action against criminals themselves. Like the Heinlein system, this one is personal responsibility to the extreme, and government has basically no role here. In pioneer societies and small societies, this probably works very well. There are enormous practical problems with this system on a large, scale, though. In counties with a weaker police force, such as Mexico, we can clearly see what happens when government does nothing—no one stands up to stop crime.

There is something else to discuss here, that relates to the “rational anarchist” system and the Heinlein system: Personal responsibility. Ignoring the flaws in both these systems for a moment, look at the purpose they are trying to achieve: to administer justice while not impinging on personal responsibility in any way. The Heinlein system does this by not forcing a person into treatment, and the rational anarchist system does this by abolishing the role of government in creating justice. In my mind, this begs the question “is it worth it?” Is personal responsibility such an important goal in a society, and should we sacrifice practicality for it? Your answer will depend on your political view.

Finally, I have a question for my readers, which will probably relate to which system they agree with (at least morally). The question is this: What is the definition of the word “justice” on a moral level? In part 3 I will explore this question, along with some of my other thoughts on this topic in general. 

Law and order (part 1)

Though we often forget it, our current justice system dates back to the Bronze Age, with Hammurabi’s Code “An eye for an eye.” Since then, revenge-based justice systems have dominated the world. This is also reinforced by our non-deterministic view of the universe in general—we treat society/people as though they have free will, even if they really do not. Today, our justice system in the US suffers moral problems because of this along with practical problems because of some of the system’s other aspects. In this post, and possibly a few following it, I would like to discuss alternative systems that would better suit our needs.

The first alternative I can think of is the “Brave New World” option: treat society as if it is deterministic, and pay no attention to personal liberties, privacy, individualism, or civil liberties (because such things are meaningless in a deterministic universe). In BNW, everyone is brainwashed, conditioned, and on hallucinogenic drugs to keep them happy 100% of the time, and there is no crime whatsoever because of this. There are actually a few positive things I can say about the system. You might think that this kind of setup is practical but not moral, but the truth is exactly the opposite, at least in terms of non-theist moralities. The BNW system does prevent crime, and it ensured the most amount of happiness for the people living in it. This makes it superior to other moral systems if judged on the basis of creating happiness (which may be the only way of comparing two moral systems without challenging the religious beliefs of either one). However, despite the BNW system’s moral superiority, it has many practical problems. It creates a populace that is unable to live in conditions beyond those they have been prepared for. Thus, should anything happen to the centralized government, the society would collapse and almost everyone would die. The author of BNW, Aldous Huxley, highlights this enormous flaw by showing how brainwashed people cannot perform basic survival necessities such as finding potable water or comestibles. Also, the BNW option is wildly impractical, as it takes a long time to carry out, and it represents the kind of thinking that the Western world has always opposed.

The next alternative is the “rehab” option. Supporters of this idea believe that the prison system should be abolished and replaced with clinical rehabilitation centers. The moral justification for this is that the current definition of “justice” is very similar to revenge, which is undesirable in the modern world. Instead, according to the theory, our justice system should work to make criminals better people ad help them return to society, not punish them, since punishing people serves no moral purpose. (Like the BNW option, the rehab system also has a deterministic slant to it.) On a practical level, supporters of the rehab idea will highlight every flaw in the prison system and explain how this will be fixed by the rehab system. This idea also has some genuinely good reasoning behind it, but there are some practical flaws in it as well. First, the science of psychology has not yet risen to the point where this can be entirely effective. Psychologists can be fooled—and therein lies one of the largest problems with the system. (Judges—who would be psychologists—could be tricked into exonerating a person who is actually guilty and psychologically unbalanced. Indeed, many convicts are probably able to answer questions with sang-froid  and poise when conditions require it.) Next, this system would not fix problems such as prison overcrowding, as supporters of the theory claim. In spite of all this, I agree with the original thesis: a justice system based on revenge, as ours is, serves little moral purpose (punishing a person to make them a better person does not count—this is a pragmatic and practical reason, not a moral one).

The next option I can think of is the “Heinlein” option, which is a system invented by (surprise) the science fiction author and philosopher Robert A. Heinlein (pictured). This system also denounces the idea of having a justice system based on revenge, but the solution here is a very different from either of the two above. Rather than treating society in a deterministic way, the Heinlein system protects privacy, free will, and personal responsibility to the nth degree while still working to reform criminals rather than punish them. This is achieved as follows: Upon being convicted of a crime, a criminal is given two options: to submit to psychological treatment (like in the “rehab” option) or to leave the society. They may allow themselves to be exported to other countries if possible, or they may enter Coventry, which is a large land area set aside for the purpose of housing those who refuse treatment. Inside of Coventry the government does not intervene in anyway, and no official government exists there. If a person wishes to leave, they must go through the “rehab” program before they are re-admitted into society. The main point is that even if the state finds the convict insane, he or she is still given the two options—thus, person responsibility is assumed at all times. However, there are practical flaws here too. Firstly—who is going to provide the land for Coventry? This sounds like a silly question, but I doubt any American would be willing to cede their land to the government, and it is highly unlikely that a large amount of people concentrated in one area would. Next, any problem associated with the “rehab” option can also apply to this one. Finally, there is the issue of what happens inside Coventry itself—governments, factions, and even terrorist groups may form, which may threaten the people outside of Coventry as well. Also, excessive force may be required to ensure that people stay there.

That’s all I have time for today. Next time, I will explore this topic a little more. 

China: a ‘threat to democracy’?

For those who have been following my last few posts on culture and the debates that have ensued on their comments pages, I am sorry to say that I am going to change tracks a bit, at least for now. There are a few political issues I would like to discuss. However, I promise I will eventually return to the topics of culture and cultural manipulation, as they are far to important for me to only write about one or twice. 

I recently read an article on the BBC News website about how China’s anti-democracy stance will affect the 21^st century. The article cites Lord Chris Patten, a famous British ex-politician, who stated in his new book, “China is a threat to democracy.” According to Patten, this is because China has not taken a hard line on humanitarian issues in neighboring countries such as Myanmar. Because of this, says Patten, China sends the message to other nations that it is acceptable to be “authoritarian, illiberal, proto-capitalism.”

I have to agree with Patten’s thesis. Asia has no binding contracts between nations the way the EU has, so if China does not force other Asian nations to protect human rights, nothing will change. Though the Chinese hold a supercilious attitude towards the nations surrounding it, they do little to help these nations. China’s imperialism also worries me—China have been gradually forcing its will on cultural groups that are entirely unrelated to Han China, including Tibet and Qinghai. If this troubling pattern continues, China may re-emerge as a conquering empire. Also, I think that the Chinese relationship with the government of Sudan will continue to be a serious political issue in the years to come.

What can we do about it? Unfortunately, very little. Usurping the Chinese government is not an option, since globalization demands that the Chinese government and economy must remain stable. (Also, there are some moral issues with this, of course.) Nor will acting sycophant towards the Chinese make them listen to us any more than they do now. What we must do instead is take a hard line with China, and have the UN impose sanctions on them if necessary. Since China is most likely going to be the most powerful nation in the world in a decade or two, now is the time to get them on the right track. Indeed, this parvenu of a nation must be sent on the road to democracy, or else all the US has been working for will be lost.